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OPINION AND ANALYSIS

OPINION: Covid has sent Germany into hysteria again but the remedy is under its nose

The rocketing Covid cases and rising patient numbers has seen Germany lurch once again towards national hysteria and the current strategy means the country's incoming government are in danger of committing political suicide, writes Brian Melican.

A face mask lies in autumn leaves in Hamburg.
A face mask lies in autumn leaves in Hamburg. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Christian Charisius

Although German is more renowned for its complicated compound nouns than its compact witticisms, it’s not short on pithy morsels. There’s this one, for example: aus Angst vor dem Tod Selbstmord begehen – to commit suicide for fear of dying. It aptly describes a very human mechanism: when faced with seemingly overwhelming danger, many people either exhaust all other options (including patently bad ones) before taking real action or, worse, do nothing at all.

Having said that, English has certainly got a knack for good analogies, and recently, I’ve been searching for the German equivalent of this one: “When you’ve got a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” 

Both these figures of speech are useful ways of looking at the current Coronavirus situation in Germany – which is, of course, not good. Case numbers are high, vaccination rates are low, and the atmosphere is apocalyptic.

After November 2020 (the half-arsed “semi-lockdown”) and April 2021 (the doomed “Easter break”), for the third time in just over a year, the country is suffering a collective nervous breakdown over a pandemic which has, later than elsewhere, but just as unforgivingly, laid bare our most unattractive national traits: a tendency to alternate between states of chauvinism and hysteria, an obsession with pointless details excluding the bigger picture, and a deeply unbalanced concept of liberty. For anyone asking “How did we get here?” (or perhaps: “Why are we still here?”), this is what’s happened.

Self congratulation

Germany likes to think of itself as being among the best, and is especially happy when its successes come either from innovation and high quality or from the strict, disciplined application of rules. So early last year, when a prompt national lockdown with high levels of compliance seemed to keep the virus at bay, this – combined with the fact that Germany also had good PCR testing where other countries were lacking it – had us all patting ourselves on the back. 

A Covid test centre in Schkeuditz, Saxony.
A Covid test centre in Schkeuditz, Saxony. Photo: picture alliance/dpa/dpa-Zentralbild | Sebastian Willnow

The flipside was the usual chauvinism. In summer 2020, Germans on holiday would come back “shocked” at all those Italians hugging or the French still exchanging kisses. In their astonishment, the fact that they were returning without being routinely tested escaped them – much as it escaped a government also too busy with self-congratulation to put in place much by way of preparation for the autumn.

That was unfortunate, because, as it turned out, we basically got lucky last spring. What autumn revealed was that all the performative hand-disinfecting and door-to-table mask-wearing in the world wasn’t enough to stop Covid when, outside of restaurant settings, Germans were behaving like pretty much everyone else: meeting family, hugging friends, bending rules. 

READ ALSO: 7 things the Covid-19 crisis has taught us about Germany

Yet rather than just accept that we, too, are humans faced with a very nasty virus, we panicked about the fact that we were no longer on par with wholly incomparable countries (e.g. New Zealand) and simply facing the same trouble as our immediate neighbours. That rates of illness and death here, while higher than hoped, were still considerably lower than across the borders in pretty much every direction was not deemed a moderate success, but rather grounds for national hysteria. 

The result was a deeply damaging seven-month lockdown so inescapably grinding that compliance broke down halfway through, precipitating a nationwide curfew of dubious constitutionality. After (an unfortunately late) spring eventually freed us from this dysfunctionality, we immediately reverted back to national chauvinism, basking in the success of the Germany-made BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine while we scorned other vaccines, like Renaults next to BMWs on a dealership forecourt.

Now, as we stumble into winter with under 70 percent of the population fully vaccinated and ICUs under strain, we have flipped back to national hysteria. While Denmark is only reapplying minimal Covid measures at 400 cases per 100,000 inhabitants per week, Germany is doubling down on measures which never went away at the 300 mark and the national mood is somewhere between “We’re all doomed” and “Please, just shoot me”.

Education, fiscal prudence, digitisation – and now Corona: clearly we have immense difficulty with the idea that we might just be a normal central European country and not either an absolute Weltmeister or an abject failure.

A police van drives through Hanover during the government curfew in April.
A police van drives through Hanover during the government curfew in April as part of the months-long shutdown. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Ole Spata

Obsession with detailed rules

It’s a hallmark of hysteria that prevents those gripped by it from assessing their options and responding adequately. This is worsened by a long-held national tendency which has been given free rein since Coronavirus struck: an obsessive approach to detailed rules which gets in the way of actual issues.

That’s why it’s illegal to cross the road on a red light even when there’s no traffic, but totally legal to drive two tonnes of metal at over 30mph even in built-up areas. That’s also why it’s legal to be an unvaccinated medical professional and treat vulnerable patients in Hamburg’s hospitals, but illegal to take off your mask in all manner of outdoor spaces – unless, of course, you have one of the numerous exemptions, have bought a takeaway coffee, or want a cigarette…

German also has a neat word for this kind of ‘displacement activity’: Ersatzhandlungen. The solutions currently being proposed, withdrawn, and proposed again are all, to varying degrees of egregiousness, displacement activity which fails to deal with the elephant in the room. It’s an elephant shaped like the 30 percent of the population who have not yet received even a single dose of vaccination against the virus. 

And so new legislation will allow for making the fully-vaccinated take tests to go to restaurants (“2G Plus”) and re-imposing mask wearing into the bargain, will limit public transport to those who have immunity, a vaccine pass, or an up-to-date negative test (“3G”), and will gives states powers to impose lockdowns if things get out of hand.

And while this new approach is certainly preferable to the previous federal-level solution, all of it is just managing a pandemic instead of really pushing for, say, Portuguese levels of vaccination which would put us in a much better position. 

READ ALSO: Why are so many Germans reluctant to get vaccinated?

A Hamburg bar excludes unvaccinated people
A Hamburg bar excludes unvaccinated people (so-called 2G rules). Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Marcus Brandt

German politicians have not levelled with those unvaccinated 

There is a massive irony to the fact that the most effective Covid vaccine out there was developed in Germany, yet Germans have proved some of the most unwilling to take it (or any others) in Europe. There are lots of reasons for this hesitancy, but it won’t do to shift the blame wholly onto the population. It’s a political failure.

Unfortunately, we were told all of last year that our world-class testing infrastructure and comparatively early adoption of surgical and construction-grade masks were keeping our figures low. And so now, 18 grinding months of restrictions later and even with a plethora of vaccines at our disposal, a non-negligible number of Germans still think tests and masks will be enough to ride this thing out. Why? Because, thus far, politicians have proven unwilling to level with them. 

READ ALSO: Germany’s planned Covid restrictions to fight fourth wave

That’s perhaps why, over yet another wasted summer, the outgoing grand coalition – led by Chancellor Angela Merkel – allowed vaccination to drift off to a wholly hyperlocal level, predicating people’s interest in or access to it on their relationship to their GPs (assuming they have one…). Only now, as health experts are raising the alarm every day is there any talk of reactivating large-scale vaccination centres. What there will certainly be, though, as of next week: more tests.

Essentially, lateral-flow tests and masks are Germany’s hammer, and so all of our Covid problems look like nails. The problems are, however, screws. And the fact that we are still hammering away at them rather than using our screwdriver (i.e. vaccination) is so frustrating that it’s painful to watch. 

We are now faced with the spectacle of an incoming administration which, rather than even just forcing nurses and care-workers to get vaccinated, is planning to make the doubly, potentially even triply inoculated get near-daily tests.

The 70 percent of us who have overridden the national tendency to excessive caution are still being treated as ticking time-bombs while live munition is wondering around all over the place. This is tantamount to placing a powder keg under trust in the state and in medical science. For fear of death at the ballot box dealt out by the 30 percent, Germany’s new government currently looks intent on committing potentially explosive suicide.

READ ALSO: Germany risks losing support of the vaccinated in Covid fight

Member comments

  1. Sick of the people who refuse to get vaccinated, while sensible people are waiting to get our third jab. No, I won’t agree to also be also forced to take a test to go somewhere the same as someone who cannot be bothered to be vaccinated.
    This Government is too scared to take the Bull by the horns & make these idiots get a jab.

    1. We cannot vaccinate our way out of this. It is the like the flu and we have never “ beaten” the flu through vaccination.

      The only long term solution is to gradually reduce the masks, the restrictions and rely on natural immunity in the longer term.

      1. Agreed. This idea that vaccination is a silver bullet is misleading, and not borne out by historical approach to any other illness. And shame and blame, or creating essentially two societies based on vaccination status, is not constructive or solving the problem at the root. Also, “breakthrough cases” are not so rare. There have been countless cases of vaccinated individuals in the US and around the world who have still gotten sick and can still be carriers. Treating the unvaccinated as pariahs, or the source of the ongoing pandemic, is simply isolating a segment of the population further with faulty reasoning.

        1. You are false to put this on the same level. Vaccinated people are much less likely to become reinfected, much less likely to become very ill, and much less likely to spread the disease, thus reducing the chance of further more dangerous mutations.

          1. Richard. You are incorrect in part of your statement.

            “Vaccinated are much less likely to become very ill” – Partly true as symptoms seem to be reduced, although many vaccinated are becoming ill and dying too.

            “Vaccinated people are much less likely to become infected” – They are less likely to become infected at first, but the vaccine effectiveness drops off after a few months. Recent data from the UK (Public Health England) for weeks 36-44 shows that for everyone over 30 years, infection rates are HIGHER in the vaccinated. No-one seems to know how this can be, and the media are not really talking about it, but the data is the data.

            “Vaccinated are much less likely to spread the disease” – This is completely false. They have known for many months now that viral loads for those infected are the same regardless of vaccination status. US CDC has confirmed this. Data from UK and Israel has confirmed this. If viral loading is the same then infectiousness is also the same.

            It is also worth considering that if symptoms are lower and testing less frequent for the vaccinated, it is the vaccinated who are far more likely to be the driver of disease spread at this point in time.

          2. Just one further point:
            Mass vaccinating into a pandemic is actually a driver of mutations, dangerous or otherwise. This is especially the case for “leaky” vaccines that don’t block infection.
            This used to be well known virology 101 before 2020.

      2. I agree that Vaccination is not the ultimate solution, but it helps get us out of this just like the flu jab reduces cases. And people who will not even get vaccinated are filling up the wards that could otherwise be avaviable to people with existing problems

    2. The government certainly spent their resources in the wrong places such as poorly effective lateral flow tests, instead of investing in a campaign to get people vaccinated. Just because the vaccination is the first application of mRNA, does not mean its not well researched and understood; it has decades of research supporting its effectiveness. The lack of scientific rational and explanation around the technology has allowed for anti-vaxers to spread their misinformation.

      1. Completely agree. And where I live (Eastern Part of NRW), there was a massive shortage of vaccine. I had to BEG my Doctor to find just one more dose and get the first jab, and I’m 65 and that was not until May 26th 2021!
        Laschet totally mishandled the situation here. Thank God he is now History.

  2. I have yet to see proof that this constant testing concept has any ACTUAL result on infections or spread. The correlation associated with it can be compared with every other European country that also saw reductions as temperatures went up, and you see that this huge expense on testing is just a waste of money.

    Unlike other commenters believe, vaccination is the way out of this, combined with actually checking and verifying vaccination status and ID. Contrary to belief, vaccination has both effectively eradicated disease (i.e. measles) and does effectively reduce infection rate and severity (i.e. flu) when the uptake is significant enough.

    The concept of natural herd immunity through devastating levels of infection and recovery is both irresponsible in respect to humanity and highly risky in regards to emergence of variants.

  3. I think we could do with some moderation of BJD’s comments – several of these ‘facts’ are really not true

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ECONOMY

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany’s debt brake and how does it affect residents?

Nothing sums up Germany's cautious relationship with money quite as well as the debt brake - but this little clause in the constitution has recently caused no end of chaos. Here's what you need to know about the so-called 'Schuldenbremse'.

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany's debt brake and how does it affect residents?

What is the debt brake and why did Germany introduce it?

Known as the Schuldenbremse in German, the debt brake is a cap on government borrowing that’s enshrined in Germany’s constitution. It states that the federal government can only take on a certain amount of new debt in each fiscal year.

This is capped at 0.35 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the amount of money the country produces each year in goods and services. Though GDP varies from year to year, this generally gives the government enough wiggle room to borrow around €9 billion annually.

When it comes to spending on a regional level – i.e. by state governments in Germany – the rules are even stricter. States aren’t allowed to borrow any money to fund their plans and must therefore create balanced budgets that finance spending exclusively through tax income and money from the central government.

But why exactly has Germany decided to tie itself to such strict rules on spending? Well, there are quite a few answers to that. 

Back in 2009, the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD), led by Angela Merkel, decided to bring the debt brake into law. At the time, the global economy was struggling to deal with the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, and Germany was racking up a huge deficit. 

The idea was to bring borrowing back under control as soon as possible and prevent leaving billions of euros in debt for future generations to pay off. It also paid homage to the main edicts of neo-liberalism, creating a streamlined state with little room for generous investments or high social welfare payments. 

Thanks to the ongoing effects of the financial crisis, the debt break only came into force seven years after it was put in the constitution. This means that since 2016, the federal governments have been tied to 0.35 percent cap on borrowing.

That said, there are a few exceptions to the Schuldenbremse: in periods of national emergency, such as natural disasters or pandemics, the government is allowed to put the debt brake to one side. That’s exactly what happened during the Covid pandemic in the years 2020 to 2022, and now it appears it will be put aside for the fourth year in a row. In other words, it has been sidelined for exactly half of the time it has been in place.

READ ALSO: Germany to seek debt rule suspension for 2023

Why has the debt brake been in the news recently?

The debt brake was put in the spotlight in early November when Germany’s Constitutional Court declared tens of billions of earmarked government spending to be ‘unconstitutional’.

The case related to €60 billion of borrowing that was originally intended for tackling the Covid crisis but had later been diverted towards a fund for fighting climate change known as the Climate and Transformation Fund.

In normal cases, moving unspent money around wouldn’t be a problem – but in this case, the specific rules around the debt brake came into play. Utilising the exceptions in the debt brake, the €60 billion was borrowed for the purpose of stabilising the economy during the pandemic – and as such it was only supposed to go towards tackling that emergency.

Wind turbines in Germany

Wind turbines in the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Christian Charisius

Beyond this amount, which already represents a huge chunk of the national budget, the court decision also invalidated the Economic Stabilisation Fund (WSF). This fund was also originally set up during the Covid crisis and later repurposed as Olaf Scholz’s ‘Doppelwumms’: a €200 billion pot that paid for the energy price breaks and other relief measures in the wake of the Ukraine war. 

READ ALSO:

Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) announced that the debt brake would be set aside for one more year to allow the government to meet its financial commitments for 2023. However, the budget for next year – and how the significant gaps in funding will be filled – still remain unclear.

The crisis has sparked a major debate among politicians about whether the debt brake is still fit for purpose. 

What do critics of the debt brake say? 

As you might expect, the tight controls on spending aren’t popular with everyone – especially those on the left on the political spectrum. 

Proponents of the debt brake say we should lower the deficit to avoid lumbering future generations with unmanageable debts, but critics of the mechanism make the opposite argument. They say that straightjacketing spending will actually put a strain on future generations as the government will be unable to invest in modern infrastructure and could therefore be hindering growth.

If borrowing is slashed too much and tax revenues don’t increase, projects like the green transformation, upgrading public transport and pushing ahead with digitalisation will inevitably be put on the backburner. The government will be forced to prioritise its urgent day to day spending in the present rather than trying to invest in the future – and it could also be forced to cut vital public services.

Deutsche Bahn train

Deutsche Bahn staff give the sign for an ICE high speed train to leave the main railway station in Stuttgart, southern Germany, on August 11, 2021. Photo by THOMAS KIENZLE / AFP

Other critics argue that the debt brake was appropriate at the time when it was introduced but that times have changed and governments require more flexibility. 

In the early to mid-2000s, Germany was riding high on a booming manufacturing and exports sector fuelled by cheap Russian gas, and had made little attempt to invest in renewable energy. Now, however, with Germany transitioning away from cheap Russian gas while trying to slash the country’s carbon emissions, Germany is faced with numerous expensive challenges at a time when the economy is especially weak – meaning borrowing more or raising more taxes feel like an inevitability. 

READ ALSO: ‘2024 a turning point’: When will Germany’s rail network run on time?

Could the debt brake be reformed in the future?

That’s certainly an idea that’s come from multiple camps – not least Economics Minister Robert Habeck of the Green Party. Speaking at the recent Green Party Conference, Habeck slammed the current rules on borrowing, stating: “With the debt brake as it is, we have voluntarily tied our hands behind our backs and are going into a boxing match.”

According to Habeck, the debt brake should be reformed according to the “green golden rule” to allow borrowing for investments rather than everyday spending. This is an idea that has also been put forward by economists.

Saskia Esken, the co-leader of the SPD, has also spoken out in favour of a reform of the debt brake to avoid putting a drag on growth in the future. 

However, the likelihood of this happening seems low at the moment, even if Greens and SPD politicians – and some members of the CDU – are in favour of it. 

That’s because it takes a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag to change any aspect of the Grundgesetz, or constitution – a much higher bar than the simple majority needed to change a law.

The FDP, who are in the coalition alongside the Greens and SPD, are also fiercely opposed to any reform of the debt brake and want to rein in government spending instead. 

Christian Lindner

German Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) speaks in the Bundestag. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

Messing with this fiscal rule could also prove unpopular: a recent poll found that 61 percent on Germans were opposed to any reform of the debt brake, as opposed to 35 percent who were in favour of it, and 4 percent who didn’t know. 

It means that in the medium term at least, the government may have to take a scalpel to its previous spending plans, cutting spending on investment projects, public services like healthcare and transport and social welfare such as child and unemployment benefits. Or it may find a way to raise some taxes without upsetting the FDP. 

READ ALSO: How Germany’s budget crisis could affect you

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