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OPINION AND ANALYSIS

ANALYSIS: Will a controversial police raid influence the German election?

A plot line worthy of a Netflix political thriller has entered the German election campaign at the very last minute. Could it have a decisive impact on the result? Jörg Luyken looks a little deeper.

ANALYSIS: Will a controversial police raid influence the German election?
The Federal Finance Ministry. Photo: dpa | Christophe Gateau

Shortly after 9am last Thursday, Finance Minister Olaf Scholz learned that a team of prosecutors was standing outside the gate to the Nazi-era Finance Ministry building. 

The investigators had travelled from Osnabrück in Lower Saxony accompanied by four policemen. Armed with a search warrant, they told the minister that they would need to look through rooms and documents in the building as part of an ongoing inquiry.

READ ALSO: German and finance ministries searched in fraud investigations

The focus of the investigation was the Financial Intelligence Unit (FUI), a team tasked with assessing tip offs from banks about money laundering and passing them on to prosecutors. The FUI is suspected of obstructing an investigation into a multi-million-euro money laundering operation, possibly involving terror funding in Africa.

Within a couple of hours the national news bulletins were all leading on one story: “Prosecutors raid the Finance Ministry.”

With just two weeks to go before the election, these raids had the potential to act as political dynamite.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD), for whom Scholz is the Chancellor candidate, has sailed into the lead in national polling, pulling past the conservative CDU and the Greens.

And it is clear why. For many Germans, the Finance Minister’s dullness and lack of emotion are a sign of competence and rigour; the CDU’s affable candidate Armin Laschet is seen as lightweight and unserious by comparison; Annalena Baerbock of the Greens lacks experience.

But Scholz has a chink in his armour: past failures to act decisively against financial malpractice have left the impression he is too lax on bankers.

During the Cum-Ex scandals he met with the head of a Hamburg bank that had defrauded the taxpayer of millions just weeks before the tax office wrongly let the bank keep the cash. And then Wirecard got away with the largest fraud in German history right under the nose of a financial authority Scholz was responsible for.

So, a new investigation into financial wrongdoing, this time leading right up to his door step, seemed to fit a pattern.

But perhaps it fitted that pattern just a little too conveniently. Because, when you look a little closer things become a little murkier.

Osnabrück’s chief prosecutor is a member of the CDU. And the prosecutor’s office is under the authority of Lower Saxony’s justice minister, Barbara Havliza, herself a CDU politician who was formerly presiding judge at the Osnabrück city court – the same court that granted the search warrant.

READ ALSO: How to explain German vaccine hesitancy?

The Social Democrats are sure that the raid was politically motivated. They point to the very different wording of the arrest warrant, which merely stated that they wanted to “identify relevant staff” at the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and gather information on their communications.

But the prosecutor’s press release – meant for public consumption – implied a more politically sensitive element to the investigation. The object was to find out “the extent to which the leadership of the ministry… …were involved in decisions of the FIU,” the statement read. In other words, did Scholz or his closest advisors do anything untoward?

Legal experts have expressed surprise that the Osnabrück prosecutors applied for a search warrant before even alerting the Finance Ministry. Normal procedure is to first write to request the relevant files. As one legal professor put it to der Spiegel: “The [application for a] search warrant can only be read as a clear sign of mistrust towards the responsible people at the ministry.”

Osnabrück’s prosecutors have insisted that political considerations “played no role”. Instead they suggested that they had reason to believe that bureaucrats at the ministry wouldn’t have given them everything that they wanted had they requested the documents in writing.

What reason could the prosecutors have had to suspect that Scholz’s staff were hiding something? After all, the FUI isn’t even fully under the control of the Finance Ministry, which doesn’t have Fachaufsicht over its activities i.e. it doesn’t have the power to look into the its individual investigations.

Scholz has himself implied that the prosecutors behaved improperly, asking why they didn’t submit their queries in writing.

Of course, the SPD’s reaction could be an attempt to redirect the public’s attention. But there are real issues surrounding the impartiality of Germany’s prosecutors.

Back in 2019, the European Court of Justice banned German prosecutors from issuing EU-wide arrest warrants, saying that they were not sufficiently independent from executive influence.

A quirk of German law that dates at least to the days of the Weimar Republic allows government ministers to intervene in prosecutors’ work. This blurring of the separation of powers has been described by Süddeutsche Zeitung editor Heribert Prantl as “the original sin of the Bundesrepublik.”

Still, political plots seem a bit too lurid for the dull world of German politics. Who really believes that the gaffe-prone Laschet was pulling the strings behind the scenes in a high-risk bid to defame his opponent?

But the CDU leader – under intense pressure to turn around his party’s grim fortunes – couldn’t resist the chance to attack his rival during a prime time TV duel on Sunday evening.

Looking deeply concerned by events at the Finance Ministry, he lambasted Scholz for a failure of management which had made the prosecutor’s raids inevitable. He then added for good measure that his rival was “acting like populists in other countries” by questioning the prosecutor’s motives.

There was something contrived about Laschet’s attack – especially his insistence that he would move the FIU away from the Finance Ministry to the Bundeskriminalamt (his political godfather Wolfgang Schäuble moved the unit in the opposite direction back in 2017). It smacked of a last-ditch attempt to make something, anything stick.

SEE ALSO: What’s behind the German fascination with foraging for wild mushrooms?

But he got under his opponent’s skin. Visibly riled, Scholz insisted that Laschet retract his “deliberately misleading” accusations.

The German public didn’t seem to buy what Laschet was selling, though. Snap polling after the TV duel once again showed Scholz to be viewed as more competent and trustworthy.

The affair has echoes of the ‘October surprise’ that knocked Hillary Clinton off her stride in the US Presidential election in 2016.

On that occasion, the FBI made a much-criticized decision to announce that it was investigating emails sent by Clinton during her time as Secretary of State. The investigation drew a blank and Clinton would later blame the FBI for her defeat to Donald Trump.  

This is unlikely to be Scholz’s Clinton moment. Nonetheless, it could add a surprise element to an election run in the all seemed to be going Scholz’s way.

Jörg Luyken is the creator of The German Review. You can sign up to his bi-weekly newsletter on German current affairs here.

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ECONOMY

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany’s debt brake and how does it affect residents?

Nothing sums up Germany's cautious relationship with money quite as well as the debt brake - but this little clause in the constitution has recently caused no end of chaos. Here's what you need to know about the so-called 'Schuldenbremse'.

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany's debt brake and how does it affect residents?

What is the debt brake and why did Germany introduce it?

Known as the Schuldenbremse in German, the debt brake is a cap on government borrowing that’s enshrined in Germany’s constitution. It states that the federal government can only take on a certain amount of new debt in each fiscal year.

This is capped at 0.35 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the amount of money the country produces each year in goods and services. Though GDP varies from year to year, this generally gives the government enough wiggle room to borrow around €9 billion annually.

When it comes to spending on a regional level – i.e. by state governments in Germany – the rules are even stricter. States aren’t allowed to borrow any money to fund their plans and must therefore create balanced budgets that finance spending exclusively through tax income and money from the central government.

But why exactly has Germany decided to tie itself to such strict rules on spending? Well, there are quite a few answers to that. 

Back in 2009, the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD), led by Angela Merkel, decided to bring the debt brake into law. At the time, the global economy was struggling to deal with the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, and Germany was racking up a huge deficit. 

The idea was to bring borrowing back under control as soon as possible and prevent leaving billions of euros in debt for future generations to pay off. It also paid homage to the main edicts of neo-liberalism, creating a streamlined state with little room for generous investments or high social welfare payments. 

Thanks to the ongoing effects of the financial crisis, the debt break only came into force seven years after it was put in the constitution. This means that since 2016, the federal governments have been tied to 0.35 percent cap on borrowing.

That said, there are a few exceptions to the Schuldenbremse: in periods of national emergency, such as natural disasters or pandemics, the government is allowed to put the debt brake to one side. That’s exactly what happened during the Covid pandemic in the years 2020 to 2022, and now it appears it will be put aside for the fourth year in a row. In other words, it has been sidelined for exactly half of the time it has been in place.

READ ALSO: Germany to seek debt rule suspension for 2023

Why has the debt brake been in the news recently?

The debt brake was put in the spotlight in early November when Germany’s Constitutional Court declared tens of billions of earmarked government spending to be ‘unconstitutional’.

The case related to €60 billion of borrowing that was originally intended for tackling the Covid crisis but had later been diverted towards a fund for fighting climate change known as the Climate and Transformation Fund.

In normal cases, moving unspent money around wouldn’t be a problem – but in this case, the specific rules around the debt brake came into play. Utilising the exceptions in the debt brake, the €60 billion was borrowed for the purpose of stabilising the economy during the pandemic – and as such it was only supposed to go towards tackling that emergency.

Wind turbines in Germany

Wind turbines in the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Christian Charisius

Beyond this amount, which already represents a huge chunk of the national budget, the court decision also invalidated the Economic Stabilisation Fund (WSF). This fund was also originally set up during the Covid crisis and later repurposed as Olaf Scholz’s ‘Doppelwumms’: a €200 billion pot that paid for the energy price breaks and other relief measures in the wake of the Ukraine war. 

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Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) announced that the debt brake would be set aside for one more year to allow the government to meet its financial commitments for 2023. However, the budget for next year – and how the significant gaps in funding will be filled – still remain unclear.

The crisis has sparked a major debate among politicians about whether the debt brake is still fit for purpose. 

What do critics of the debt brake say? 

As you might expect, the tight controls on spending aren’t popular with everyone – especially those on the left on the political spectrum. 

Proponents of the debt brake say we should lower the deficit to avoid lumbering future generations with unmanageable debts, but critics of the mechanism make the opposite argument. They say that straightjacketing spending will actually put a strain on future generations as the government will be unable to invest in modern infrastructure and could therefore be hindering growth.

If borrowing is slashed too much and tax revenues don’t increase, projects like the green transformation, upgrading public transport and pushing ahead with digitalisation will inevitably be put on the backburner. The government will be forced to prioritise its urgent day to day spending in the present rather than trying to invest in the future – and it could also be forced to cut vital public services.

Deutsche Bahn train

Deutsche Bahn staff give the sign for an ICE high speed train to leave the main railway station in Stuttgart, southern Germany, on August 11, 2021. Photo by THOMAS KIENZLE / AFP

Other critics argue that the debt brake was appropriate at the time when it was introduced but that times have changed and governments require more flexibility. 

In the early to mid-2000s, Germany was riding high on a booming manufacturing and exports sector fuelled by cheap Russian gas, and had made little attempt to invest in renewable energy. Now, however, with Germany transitioning away from cheap Russian gas while trying to slash the country’s carbon emissions, Germany is faced with numerous expensive challenges at a time when the economy is especially weak – meaning borrowing more or raising more taxes feel like an inevitability. 

READ ALSO: ‘2024 a turning point’: When will Germany’s rail network run on time?

Could the debt brake be reformed in the future?

That’s certainly an idea that’s come from multiple camps – not least Economics Minister Robert Habeck of the Green Party. Speaking at the recent Green Party Conference, Habeck slammed the current rules on borrowing, stating: “With the debt brake as it is, we have voluntarily tied our hands behind our backs and are going into a boxing match.”

According to Habeck, the debt brake should be reformed according to the “green golden rule” to allow borrowing for investments rather than everyday spending. This is an idea that has also been put forward by economists.

Saskia Esken, the co-leader of the SPD, has also spoken out in favour of a reform of the debt brake to avoid putting a drag on growth in the future. 

However, the likelihood of this happening seems low at the moment, even if Greens and SPD politicians – and some members of the CDU – are in favour of it. 

That’s because it takes a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag to change any aspect of the Grundgesetz, or constitution – a much higher bar than the simple majority needed to change a law.

The FDP, who are in the coalition alongside the Greens and SPD, are also fiercely opposed to any reform of the debt brake and want to rein in government spending instead. 

Christian Lindner

German Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) speaks in the Bundestag. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

Messing with this fiscal rule could also prove unpopular: a recent poll found that 61 percent on Germans were opposed to any reform of the debt brake, as opposed to 35 percent who were in favour of it, and 4 percent who didn’t know. 

It means that in the medium term at least, the government may have to take a scalpel to its previous spending plans, cutting spending on investment projects, public services like healthcare and transport and social welfare such as child and unemployment benefits. Or it may find a way to raise some taxes without upsetting the FDP. 

READ ALSO: How Germany’s budget crisis could affect you

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