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OPINION AND ANALYSIS

OPINION: Scholz is already out of step with Germany – it’s time for a change of course

Olaf Scholz has seen his popularity ratings plummet in Germany amid the Ukraine crisis. After a promising start, the Chancellor has retreated into Merkel-era habits that no longer match the country he is leading, writes Brian Melican.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz
Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) at an April cabinet meeting in Berlin. Photo: picture alliance/dpa/AFP/POOL | John Macdougall

Contrary to what many commentators are saying, what’s most surprising about Olaf Scholz’ precipitous fall in popularity is not how quickly it has happened – but rather how slowly.

Both among German voters and our allies abroad, Scholz had, until very recently, been given the benefit of the doubt to a very generous extent. After all, it would be simply unrealistic to expect him to magic away in six months Germany’s sixteen years of accumulated backlogs: a stalled green energy transition, the chronic unattractiveness of public service jobs, potentially crippling overdependence on strategic rivals Russia and China…

No one expected any of this to get solved overnight, and at least it looked like Scholz and his coalition were making a good start. So there was a huge amount of goodwill.

In what seems like an eternity ago, back in early February when the Ukraine war was still a “Ukraine crisis”, Joe Biden welcomed Olaf Scholz on his first official visit to the White House and, despite the fact our Chancellor refused to make clear that Nord Stream 2 would be cancelled if Russia invaded Ukraine, called Germany a “reliable partner” and did his best to keep his frustration in check.

It was sensible, grown-up politics: instead of trying to strongman Scholz with a public shaming, Biden worked behind closed doors to get him on side. Most of Germany’s allies, despite increasing exasperation with our shilly-shallying, did likewise.

‘Man of the hour’

This approach paid off: in his Zeitenwende speech in early March, Scholz appeared very much the man of hour, cementing the impression I and many others have of him as someone who, while not wholly devoid of dogmatism, is nonetheless willing to change positions in the face of good arguments. Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine led him to reassess his stance to date, find it wanting, and correct it accordingly.

His honesty and solemn undertaking were rewarded with plaudits from our allies – and with an unexpected bounce in popularity among voters who, it turns out, had also been doing some thinking and had overcome their long-held distaste for military matters.

READ ALSO: Zeitenwende: How war in Ukraine has sparked a historic shift in Germany

Yet it’s been downhill from there on in. Essentially, Scholz’ speech wrote a hefty cheque that his actions since have not cashed. In the far-reaching nature of the foreign and defence policy shift he announced, Scholz displayed the strong leadership which he prides himself on delivering, only to then lose the courage of his own convictions.

Instead of using the momentum his volte face gave him to grasp the bull by the horns, he shrank back from any immediate measures which might prove too radical: no heavy weapons for the Ukraine; no embargo on Russian gas; not even any further major speeches. Yes, Germany has changed its stance and yes, Germany is supplying Ukrainian forces with much-needed material. Yet the overall impression – not just among Ukrainians, but among our allies and even the general public – is that it is still too little, too late and that, as ever, Germany is reacting in a sluggishly over-bureaucratic manner. The result is widespread dissatisfaction with Scholz’ government and, naturally, with Scholz himself.

In Scholz’ inability to make good on his pledge, there are three factors at play. One of them is beyond his control; the other two are of his own making.

READ ALSO: OPINION: How many massacres will it take before Germany turns off Russian gas?

Inherited problems

Firstly, Scholz is hamstrung by circumstances. Even those of us in favour of supplying heavy weapons to the Ukraine have to accept the damning assessment of every informed professional who has examined the Bundeswehr in recent years: our own forces are operating on a bare minimum. This severely limits what we can offer. And this inability to defend even ourselves, let alone our European allies, has been twenty years in the making. The same is true of Russian gas: while I argue for an immediate embargo, I do not deny that this would have serious effects on our economy and society – and that, here too, there is no magic wand that can be waved over two decades of criminally negligent energy policy.

Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel

Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) hands flowers to former chancellor Angela Merkel as she leaves office. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

This is the situation we are now in. How we got here, however, throws an unflattering light on Scholz, who was, until he became Chancellor, Finance Minister in yet another Merkel administration which allowed defence budgets to remain below par, Bundeswehr procurement to go to pot, and our dependency on Russian gas to go from around 40 percent to 55 percent.

This is the second factor in Scholz’ current failure: although he has, commendably, identified past mistakes and promised a different approach, he is still proving unable to surmount his own habits and instincts. Even where other options would now be open, Scholz is still applying the methods of the Merkel years – delaying, delegating down to committees, and hoping problems solve themselves – in circumstances which he himself has publicly identified as radically different.

READ ALSO: ‘Too little, too late’: Scholz under fire for inaction on Ukraine

Here, the issue with the Marder IFVs is symptomatic: Rheinmetall has literally dozens of these armed people carriers sitting around which could be refurbished at relatively short notice, either to be sent directly to Ukrainian forces or cascaded down to the Bundeswehr to replace any supplied to Kyiv.

Scholz is sticking to the unconvincing line that Ukrainian soldiers couldn’t be trained to use them in time – in spite of the obvious fact that the country’s forces have already lasted longer than anyone thought they would and that the war is now clearly going to drag on. Zeitenwende politics this is not. I’m not alone in expecting proactive executive action here: Scholz has a problem when MPs in his own coalition generally well-disposed towards him such as Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmerman repeatedly take to the airwaves to denounce his “prevarication”.

No sign of a Zeitenwende

And that is the third factor at play here. Regardless of actions taken or not taken, in stylistic terms, Scholz is not living up to his own hype. This is what, in my view, is denting his popularity the most. No one is expecting miracles, but having come to power implicitly promising to explain and justify his policies more than his predecessor Angela Merkel – who preferred to preside, sphynx-like, over proceedings – Scholz has now, after a promisingly communicative start, retreated back into the Chancellery. His silence, both on the Ukraine and on other pressing issues (especially Covid policy) is leaving too much room for interpretation – and dissatisfaction.

German tanks at a military training ground in Saxony-Anhalt

German tanks at a military training ground in Saxony-Anhalt. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Klaus-Dietmar Gabbert

No doubt, Scholz is hoping to himself “do a Merkel”, keeping a low profile and becoming entrenched to the point where Germans cannot imagine life without him and so eventually come to adulate him. Times have changed, though – and as the Chancellor who coined the term Zeitenwende (“change in times” or “turning point”), nobody should be more aware of that than Olaf Scholz.

Germans are changing with the times, and now expect more than aloof Merkel-style management of our various national weaknesses: they want the sustained, systemic change Olaf Scholz said he stood for. And the change needs to start (or perhaps: start again) at the top with him. Scholz can no longer count on the benefit of the doubt.

READ ALSO: OPINION: Germany has been forced to learn the lessons from its post-war pacifism

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POLITICS

ANALYSIS: What do Germany’s far-right gains in EU elections mean for foreigners?

Despite months of scandals, the far-right AfD made significant gains in both the EU and local elections at the start of June. What does this mean for foreigners in the country?

ANALYSIS: What do Germany's far-right gains in EU elections mean for foreigners?

For many years, as in many countries, the election of the European parliament was something of a non-event in Germany.

Between 1999 and 2014, a meagre 38-43 percent of the German electorate made it to the polling booth to vote for their EU representatives, despite the country’s reputation as a cornerstone of the European project.

Over the past five years, however, the mood has changed. According to analysts at the Konrad Adenauer Stifting, EU elections have become something of a temperature check in Germany, giving disgruntled voters a chance to air their views on the governing parties in between federal and state elections. 

This year, a record 64.8 percent of voters cast their ballot – and the message to the government was clear. All three of the traffic-light coalition parties – the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and Free Democrats (FDP) – languished well below 15 percent, while the opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) parties won the largest vote share at 30 percent. 

READ ALSO: Conservatives lead as Scholz’s coalition suffers defeat at EU polls in Germany

Most shocking, however, was the other clear winner of Germany’s EU elections: the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which landed in second place with 15.9 percent of the vote and increased their vote share by almost five percent, compared to the results of the last EU elections in 2019. 

In eastern states like Thuringia, Brandenburg and Saxony, the party gained the largest share of the votes, polling around 30 percent. 

Similar results were returned in the local elections that were held the same day. In the former GDR states of Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg Western-Pomerania, the AfD emerged as the clear victor in the vast majority of local communes. 

For many foreigners in Germany – especially those who were unable to vote themselves – the gains made by the far-right have been shocking.

The AfD is emerging as a serious contender in German politics, and appears to be moving from the fringes to the mainstream. 

READ ALSO: Germany’s far-right AfD sees strong gains in local eastern elections

Normalisation of the far-right

The election results made clear that for many AfD voters, there’s no longer a reason to have to hide. A recent study by the Scientific Centre for Social Research in Berlin confirmed this view, highlighting how far-right ideas on topics like migration and Islam had come to be more widely accepted among the general public, as well as shaping media discourse.

For more than six months now, the AfD has been buffeted by scandal after scandal: in Thuringia, AfD fraction leader Björn Höcke was recently found guilty of spouting banned nazi slogans in speeches, while in the run-up the EU elections, leading candidate Maxmilian Krah was rocked by accusations of corruption after an aide was arrested on suspicion of spying for China. Then he was banned from appearing in the election after he made comments downplaying the crimes of Nazi SS officers.

AfD politician Maximilian Krah

Maximilian Krah, AfD top candidate for the European elections, makes a press statement after the meeting with the AfD parliamentary group leadership on Wednesday. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

Back in November, an investigation by Correctiv revealed that prominent members of the AfD had attended a secret meeting in which they discussed the concept of ‘remigration’: sending unwanted foreigners, including those with a migration background, back to their supposed home countries. 

But despite the media frenzy around these revelations, the far-right party still made significant gains on polling day, though admittedly not as well as earlier polls suggested.

“The strong turnout of the AfD, especially in the east German states, shows that the party increasingly establishes itself in Germany’s party system,” York Albrecht, researcher at the Institute for European Politics in Berlin, told Al Jazeera.

This increasing normalisation of extreme parties and positions could make it hard to reverse the gains that the AfD has made and may push other more parties even further to the right. 

Influence on German politics 

With all of Germany’s major parties refusing to govern alongside the AfD, it’s highly unlikely that the party will ever get a chance to enact their own policies – but their growing influence in Germany means that others may well deliver them on their behalf. 

Nowhere is this more prominent than in the backlash against widespread migration, with even centre-left parties in government taking a tougher and more populist line on the treatment of refugees, for example by restricting access to social benefits.

Though the CDU/CSU parties emerged as the winner of the EU elections, there are some questions about why they failed to capitalise fully on the disastrous polling numbers of the three ruling parties. 

While the SPD, Greens and FDP lost a total of 21 points collectively, the Union picked up just six of these, while the AfD made gains across the board. This fact could lead the centre-right parties to conclude that a further move to the right is required, such as calling for stricter migration controls, the scrapping of green policies or the restrictions of certain rights for foreigners.

This is a trend we’ve already seen in recent months from the CDU. When the party released its party programme back in May, the concept of Leitkultur took centre-stage. As opposed to multiculturism, Leitkultur involves migrants integrating fully into the dominant culture of Germany, adopting its language, culture, customs and way of life. 

READ ALSO: How the CDU wants to change Germany

Meanwhile, the poor results for the traffic-light coalition will put Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) under increased pressure to change course as the parties sit down for budget negotiations this month and next.  

Outside of the realm of parliamentary politics, it seems like fears about foreigners and the impact of migration are also on the rise.

In a 2023 survey ranking the fears of the Germans, the proportion of people who feared that Germany and its institutions could be overwhelmed by refugees rose by 11 points to 53 percent, while the proportion of people who feared migration could lead to a breakdown of German society increased by 10 point to 47 percent. 

This sense of fear and hostility may not have yet convinced the governing traffic-light coalition to change course on its plans to boost skilled migration, but the feeling of being unwelcome could have a tangible effect on foreigners’ lives.

Furthermore, if the EU elections can function as a predictor of what’s to come when the federal elections roll around in September next year, the CDU/CSU may well be in the driving seat, along with migration and social policies that echo those of the far-right. 

The wider EU picture

When it comes to the European parliament itself, the picture is slightly more nuanced.

Though the far-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) groups made gains, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), led by European President Ursula von der Leyen, remains the largest bloc. 

At present, it also appears that the extreme right is starting to fragment, especially after the AfD were kicked out of ID – in reaction to the aforementioned comments by Maximilian Krah that not all Nazi SS soldiers were criminals. 

READ ALSO: What the EU election results say about the state of politics in Germany

That said, experts agree that the latest round of parliamentary elections represents a drastic lurch to the right in European politics and could make it easier for right-wing and far-right parties to set the agenda over the next five years.

European parliament

A person holds an EU flag at the European Parliament building, during an election evening in Strasbourg, on June 9th, 2024, after the vote for the European Parliament election. Photo by: SEBASTIEN BOZON / AFP

In concrete terms, that could mean torpedoing climate initiatives like the European Green Deal and plans to phase out combustion engines over the coming years.

READ ALSO: INTERVIEW – ‘Failed climate policies are fuelling far-right politics in Germany’

On the migration policy side, the European parliament could move towards implementing tougher rules for migrants and refugees and permitting the erosion of some civil rights for foreigners. 

However, experts say a key outcome of the current parliamentary constellation is that it will simply be harder to get anything done.

“Under this parliament, it will be hard to read a clear strategic agenda other than some of the core principles around security and the economy,” Susi Dennison, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), told Al Jazeera this week.

“What we will see emerging is deal-by-deal policymaking.”

In this situation, the far-right are bound to “play hard” to enforce their policies over the next five years, Dennison added. 

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