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JOHN LICHFIELD

OPINION: French police secrecy encouraged wild conspiracy theories on Princess Diana and Al-Hilli deaths

Veteran reporter John Lichfield reported on both the death of Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed in Paris in 1997 and the Al-Hilli family in the French Alps in 2012 - he looks back at the media circus that surrounded both cases and how the French police policies encouraged the wild conspiracy theories that still rage to this day.

OPINION: French police secrecy encouraged wild conspiracy theories on Princess Diana and Al-Hilli deaths
Floral tributes to Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed near the Pont de l'Alma in Paris. Photo by Patrick KOVARIK / AFP

Wednesday is the 25th anniversary of the road accident which killed Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed in Paris. Next Monday is the 10th anniversary of the Al-Hilli murders in the French Alps.

What do these two events have in common, other than the proximity of their dates?

They are both – still – the object of wild conspiracy theories.

In both cases, if you look at the undisputed facts, the possibilities are limited. The Diana accident could only have been an accident. The Al-Hilli murders were almost certainly a random act by someone local.

Neither of these explanations is satisfactory to a chunk of the popular media – in France as well as in Britain. Wild notions still thrive.

I reported both events at the time. I have studied them in some detail. The sequence of events makes any form of assassination impossible (in the case of Diana and Dodi’s death) or extremely unlikely (in the case of the Al-Hilli murders).

In both cases, the French investigators have been criticised in the UK media. Is there any truth to the criticisms? A little; not much.

What is certainly true is that both events illustrated the huge gulf between the ways that French and Anglo-Saxon investigators deal with the media.

In theory, every party of a French criminal investigation is secret once it is handed over to an examining magistrate or juge d’instruction. In the case of the Diana accident in 1997,  the investigating magistrate, Hervé Stéphan, took that principle seriously. In the first couple of weeks, very little information, beyond the basic facts, was given to the world media assembled in Paris.

Together with a BBC colleague, Hugh Schofield, I  wrote to Judge Stéphan at the time. We said we understood the French system but unless he allowed the official findings to be released, a thousand conspiracy theories would breed.

He wrote back to say, in effect: “You are absolutely right but my hands are tied. Rules are rules.”

By the time of the Al-Hilli murders 15 years later, it seemed to me that that the French judicial authorities had learned their lessons from the information débacle in the Diana case. The Annecy chief prosecutor, Eric Maillaud, gave regular press conferences. Some of the leading gendarmerie investigators took part.

Even so, the information was limited and strangely filtered. It took a big leak to Le Monde in November (two months after the event) to establish the basic time-line of what happened in a forest lay-by near the village of Chevaline on September 5th, 2012.

Once again, the absence of fundamental information allowed wild theories to take hold.

Take the accident in Paris first. There are some areas of uncertainty. A white Fiat which struck Diana and Dodi’s limousine has never been traced. But the undisputed facts make it impossible for anyone to have organised an assassination attempt and disguised it as an accident.

The route taken by Diana and Dodi that night was random. They were trying to shake off the paparazzi on motorbikes who were pursuing them from the Ritz Hotel. Rather than go straight back to Dodi’s flat just off the Champs Elysées, they took a large detour along the fast quais beside the river Seine.

Their driver was the worse for both drink and drugs. He was actually heading away from Dodi’s flat when he crashed into a pillar in the tunnel below the Place de L’Alma.

How could anyone – M16, CIA or the Royal Family – have known that their limo would have been in that place at that time?

Now, the Al-Hilli murders.

All sorts of intriguing or suspicious-sounding information has been unearthed by the media about the three victims: Saad Al-Hilli, 50, his wife Iqbal, 47, and her mother Suhaila Al-Alaf, 74. Similar theories have been advanced to suggest that the real target of the murders was Sylvain Mollier, 46, the local cyclist found dead beside the British-Iraqi family’s car.

Both the Al-Hillis and Mollier took random decisions that day to drive or cycle to the end of a winding, bumpy 3 kilometre road into the forests and mountains above Lake Annecy.

Witnesses saw no sign that they were followed. It is difficult to imagine how a murderer – contract killer in the case of the Al-Hillis; someone with a personal grudge in the case of Mollier – could have been lying in wait for them at that isolated place at 3.30pm that afternoon.

The forensic evidence found at the scene suggests that killer was there when they arrived. It also identifies the gun used as a 70 years old (at least) 7.65 mm P06 Luger, issued to the Swiss army and police until the end of the 1930s. That is scarcely the weapon of choice for a contract killer.

After dutifully following all possible leads about Saad Al-Hilli’s business activities as a microsatellite  engineer and his quarrel with his brother about their father’s will, French investigators long ago reached a working conclusion. The murders were a random act by a deranged local man, who has since died or is still lying low.

Conclusion: the French policy of “secrecy of the investigation” encourages wild interpretations, and pure invention, to prosper. Twenty five and ten years later, the collective, popular memory – especially of the Princess Diana road accident – retains the wild theories. It is often hazy on the facts.

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JOHN LICHFIELD

OPINION: The French far-right’s ’empty vessel’ Bardella is set to win big in Europe

Here is a safe prediction - writes John Lichfield - Jordan Bardella, an empty vessel with boy-band good looks, will “win” the French section of the European elections on June 9th.

OPINION: The French far-right's 'empty vessel' Bardella is set to win big in Europe

Bardella, 28, is a university drop-out who has worked for Marine Le Pen’s Far Right Rassemblement National (RN) since he was 19. Five years ago, his list of candidates came only just ahead of President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist alliance. Next month, if opinion polls are accurate, he will take one in three of the votes cast in France and defeat Macron’s Renew list by 15 points.

Why such strong support for a superficially eloquent young man, who has refused – until now – to debate against his rivals and declined last week to take questions at a press conference?

The obvious, but inadequate, explanation is that the high polling scores for Bardella and the RN are generated by seven years of accumulated anger and disappointment with Emmanuel Macron.

European elections in France, with only one round of voting and no direct consequences for domestic policy, have become an occasion for kicking whoever happens to be in power.

That is true but not the whole truth. It would be foolish to underestimate the consequences of a 15-point victory for Bardella and the RN on June 9th. It would be equally foolish to underestimate Bardella, who is the perfect Tik-Tok politician for the early 21st century.

Jordan Bardella, Marine Le Pen’s de facto Number Two, succeeds because he manages to be everyone and no-one. He is popular because of who he is. He is also popular because of who he is not.

He is appealing because he looks like a well-scrubbed boy-next-door. He has a talent for speaking in calm, pre-cooked soundbites on 24-hour TV (and on Tik-Tok, where he has one million followers). His admirers say that he seems like an ordinary kind of guy, in other words not part of the governing elite.

He is trusted because he has not been to the usual political finishing schools. He does not speak in officialese. He is not Macron. He is not Sarkozy. He is not a Le Pen.

There is something of Boris Johnson or Donald Trump in Jordan Bardella. He does not have Johnson’s mendacious humour nor Trump’s mendacious aggressivity. But he, like them, is able to bottle and sell simplistic solutions to complex problems and point out convincingly where the complex solutions have failed.

Like Johnson and Trump, Bardella’s success depends on evasion and misrepresentation. He is not whom he seems.

He may not be a Le Pen but he is part of the family business which has dominated the Far Right of French politics for 40 years. His romantic partner is Nolwenn Olivier, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s grand-daughter and Marine’s niece.

He is not a “trained politician”. But he has been a professional politician since he was 19. He has never had another job (unlike Marine Le Pen, Sarkozy or Macron).

He is seen as a moderate and modern alternative to the Le Pen dynasty but his past positions suggest that he is a more sincere racist than Marine. In 2021, he posted statements on social media defending the ultra-right splinter group Génération Identitaire when it was banned for inciting racial hatred and violence.

Bardella, like the Le Pens, father and daughter, makes immigration the mother of all evils, but three of his grandparents were Italian and one of his great-grandfathers was Algerian.

In the last few days, there have been signs of the beginning of a French media revolt against Bardella’s impostures – and yet no sign of a dip in his opinion poll scores.

Last Thursday, he called a press conference to unveil the Rassemblement National “programme” for reforming the European Union. He stumbled through a 20-minute presentation, sounding as if he was reading the text for the first time. He then refused to take any questions.

If you read the programme on the RN campaign site, it is easy to see why Bardella was reluctant to defend it. The RN has, in theory, abandoned its vote-losing proposals to leave the EU and the European single currency. This is another imposture. The RN wants to stay in the EU but not THIS EU.

The programme calls for the replacement of the law-based Union by “freely agreed cooperations between member states, according to their interests and comparative advantages”. There is no mention of the Euro.

That is a project that Nigel Farage could defend, masquerading as EU reform. It relies on the widespread ignorance of French voters about how the EU works. The single market would be “maintained” but destroyed by allowing national preference (ie protectionism). EU supranational powers would end but Frontex, the common EU border protection force, would somehow become more powerful.

Bardella will be confronted by these contradictions when he faces Macron’s lead candidate, Valérie Heyer, in a one-on-one debate on BFMTV on Thursday night. Alarmed by the robust RN lead in the opinion polls, the Macron camp has also decided to reverse its refusal to accept a debate between Bardella and the 35-year-old Prime Minister, Gabriel Attal.

Will this mark the end of Bardella’s period of grace? I doubt it. He shares the populist force-shield once enjoyed by Boris Johnson and still possessed by Donald Trump. As a champion of anti-elitism, anti-politics and anti-Macronism, he is immune to the usual penalties for incompetence or mendacity.

The debate with Attal, if it happens, will be fascinating: a confrontation between two young men who have rocketed to the forefront of French politics. One is a not-quite-classic product of the system; the other is the plausible, pretty face of the anti-system.

In theory, Attal should eat Bardella alive, as Macron destroyed Marine Le Pen in the presidential debates of 2017 and 2022. In practise, Bardella might gain more than he loses from being placed on the same level as the Prime Minister.

Bardella will top the voting on June 9th. The only question is by how many points?

The “Marinist” RN tends to poll better than its eventual election scores. The present 15-point gap at the top may narrow a little. On the other hand, the Macron list may falter and fall – calamitously for the President – to third place behind the centre-left candidate, Raphael Glucksmann .

Either way, this “European” election could have dramatic consequences for national politics. A defeat for Macron and Attal by 10 points or more means, I believe, a national, parliamentary election before the year’s end.

Could Le Pen and Bardella win that election? Probably not. Bardella would be campaigning to be Prime Minister because Marine Le Pen is unlikely to want that poisoned job. He would be held to a much higher standard than “plausible boy-next-door”.

The likely result would be an even more splintered National Assembly, followed by two years of muddle/chaos and an agonisingly close Presidential election in 2027.

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