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POLITICS

Ditherer or deal-maker? Jury’s out on Scholz’s tank brinksmanship

Despite accusations of cowardice and dithering, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has stood firm on taking his time to weigh up a decision before finally announcing on Wednesday that Germany would supply Leopard tanks to Ukraine.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) appears on ZDF on January 25th, 2023. Photo: picture alliance/dpa/ZDF | Thomas Kierok

The brinksmanship has won plaudits from some who argue that by holding out, the German leader managed to get the United States to reverse its stance and send Abrams tanks — bringing about a bigger win for Ukraine.

But other analysts warn the weeks of delay may have left a deeper mark on Scholz’s international reputation, while also hurting Kyiv’s chances against Russian troops on the battlefield.

“The SPD chancellor has achieved one of his biggest aims: delivering battle tanks only in step with the Americans,” wrote Die Zeit weekly.

READ ALSO: Fact check: How much help has Germany given Ukraine?

Scholz’s “unusual and risky move… worked”, it added.

Conservative broadsheet Die Welt called it a “coup” for the chancellor. “Scholz has managed to get the US to change course,” it said.

‘Won’t be pushed’

In recent weeks, as allies and Kyiv alike harangued him for tanks, Scholz stressed the need for international coordination and ruled out going it alone on the heavy military equipment.

With an eye on public opinion, Scholz has been careful not to appear to be hawkishly leading the charge when it comes to military supplies to Ukraine.

Fielding questions at the Bundestag following Wednesday’s announcement, Scholz pointedly avoided playing up the powerful Leopards’ capabilities and how they could affect the outcome in Ukraine.

READ ALSO: What difference could Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks make in Ukraine?

Rather, he repeatedly underlined that it was and is “right that we did not let ourselves be pushed into this but that we rely on and also continue on
close cooperation”.

It was perhaps not a coincidence that Scholz’s announcement came after public opinion shifted slightl in favour of sending tanks, with 46 percent for and 41 percent against on January 19.

Directly addressing fears of Germans, who have favoured treading lightly around conflict zones since World War II, Scholz pointedly said he would ensure that any support for Ukraine would be provided “without the risks for our country growing in the wrong direction”.

Asked later on ZDF public television whether his hesitation had led to a “loss of trust” among allies, Scholz rejected the criticism.

“Everyone knows we are making a big contribution, also compared to other countries, in terms of support for Ukraine — not only financially and with humanitarian aid but also with weapons.”

But some analysts said his concern for domestic politics may have cost Ukraine on the frontlines.

‘Embarrassing’

In the meantime, “several months” had been lost in the defence of Ukraine, while Scholz was “more concerned with domestic politics” and an issue he did not see as a “big vote winner”, Chatham House analyst John Lough told AFP.

Fears that moving too rashly would lead to an escalation in the war were exaggerated, too. Even without tank deliveries, “the Russians have escalated anyway”, for example by targeting critical infrastructure in Ukraine, Lough said.

Amid the ruckus, particularly with neighbouring Poland accusing Scholz of dithering, analysts point to the damage done to Germany’s reputation.

Bild daily piled on the pressure at home, accusing Scholz of cowardice. But a day later, a high-profile defence ministers’ meeting of Ukraine allies last Friday still failed to break the deadlock on tanks.

The delay was “embarrassing for the German government”, said Lough.

READ ALSO: Germany gives greenlight for Leopard tank deliveries to Ukraine

Olaf Scholz

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) comments on the Russian attack on Ukraine during a press conference at the Chancellery on February 24th, 2022. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

Sudha David-Wilp, director of the German Marshall Fund’s Berlin office, said moving in lock-step with the United States gave Scholz the “political cover he needed” to say “yes” to German tank deliveries.

But his short-term win was not “necessarily good for Germany because it has lost a lot of trust” with key partners, David-Wilp said.

The way the tank drama played out “clearly shows that the US needs to play a leadership role in Europe” and its security, while German leadership remained “elusive”, she said.

Yet, for all the apparent damage to Scholz, there might be a winner.

The unexpected US tank commitment means that officials in Ukraine have “all kinds of different kit now”, David-Wilp added.

By Sebastien Ash

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POLITICS

Why are some Germans turning towards the far-right?

With the AfD taking second place in several polls, Lecturer in German Studies Alexander Clarkson told The Local why the pandemic and a feeling of constant crisis has normalised the far-right in Germany.

Why are some Germans turning towards the far-right?

The farright Alternative for Germany (AfD) have established themselves as second place in the national polls, with significant polling leads across most of east Germany and a number of victories in mayoral and district council races that have shocked many in mainstream German society.

Last week a study, called the FES Mitte, showed that the number of right-wing extremists in Germany had practically tripled in a few years, while also showing rises in homophobia, xenophobia and belief in conspiracy theories.

READ ALSO: Number of right-wing extremists in Germany ‘triples’

But what’s behind this?

The study’s co-author Beate Küpper blamed the rise in these attitudes on the rise of an increasingly confident and aggressive populism, which blames “the system” and “migration” for society’s problems, as well as the “multiple crises” that Germany has experienced in recent years, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the climate crisis and the energy crisis caused by the country’s reliance on Russian gas, imports of which were stopped after Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Alexander Clarkson, lecturer in German studies at King’s College London and a specialist in migration, thinks that the pandemic could have been more influential than people realise in the AfD’s radicalisation, while warning that there might never be a “return to normal” on some of the issues that motivate AfD voters.

An AfD supporter holds a "campaign finale" leaflet that shows the portraits of the top Hessian AfD candidates for the state election.

An AfD supporter holds a “campaign finale” leaflet that shows the portraits of the top Hessian AfD candidates for the state election. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Andreas Arnold

Due to the shared centre ground between most parties on issues such as climate change or supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion, the AfD can portray themselves as the only actual alternative for Germany on a whole range of issues, such as protesting the Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns, migration or climate-friendly measures that might be costly for citizens in the short term.

“With regard to migration, the AfD can say ‘we’re the only representative of this voice’ as there are political dynamics where governments talk tough on migration but need to take them in for economic reasons,” said Clarkson.

“We need to look at specifics of the last few years – the pandemic, the war and the sudden surge in climate protection legislation like the Heizungsgesetzt,” Clarkson continued, talking of the controversial heating law that saw raucous protests in Bavaria would have started to phase out gas and oil boilers by next year but was watered down.

But the academic thinks that the pandemic played a large and so-far understudied role in how farright ideas have spread across Germany.

“The Covid pandemic plays a central role,” he said. “Life was really bizarre and screwed up. You have farright movements telling you that this democratic state is just a facade … and then the government tells people to stay in the homes, you have a [largely justified] highly coercive policy by a democratic state. But then the far around can turn around and say ‘I told you so – they did lock you in your homes.’

“People underestimated how much distrust of the state flowed out of the pandemic. Then the AfD can work with that when huge changes [like large-scale migration and climate protection legislation] are demanded quickly. The pandemic allowed the AfD to survive the 2021 election, but it radicalised the AfD’s base, so as additional crises come in, it opens up a much wider range of the electorate to these ideas.”

READ ALSO: Why are the far-right AfD doing so well in German polls?

And then instead of returning to normal, straight after the pandemic Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became the next crisis, which is stressful for citizens. “We didn’t return to normality, we returned to crisis. Normal keeps not happening,” said Clarkson, warning that we may have to get used to living in multiple crises.

Amid a controversial cover of the news magazine Der Spiegel, which has been compared to both a 1920s antisemitic advert and a poster by Nigel Farage during the Brexit campaign, the topic of migration is once again causing huge political debate in Germany, as rising numbers of migrants and asylum seekers come to the country, alongside over a million Ukrainian refugees who will stay in Germany, particularly in places where there has been very little diversity previously.

But despite fluctuations in polls, Clarkson warns that we shouldn’t take the idea Germany is getting significantly more right wing at face value.

“The [conservative Christian Democrats] CDU going to the centre and abandoning claims to pre-1937 beyond the Oder-Niesse line, or say LGBT rights or shifts on issues of migration, all of this stuff is transforming what it means to be centre-right,” he said. 

Clarkson said one problem centres on what is viewed as far-right in Germany and that this can change. 

“Racist views that are now rightly classified as farright were pretty normal in the 1980s in the CDU, and even the [social democratic] SPD,” he said.

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