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JOHN LICHFIELD

OPINION: Macron will win the French election – and then his real problems begin

Incumbent president Emmanuel Macron is widely tipped to win the second round of the French elections. But, argues John Lichfield, the fragmentation of the French vote into three 'tribes' means that he faces a very difficult five years at the head of an increasingly divided country.

OPINION: Macron will win the French election - and then his real problems begin
Photo by Charly TRIBALLEAU / AFP

There are two ways (at least) of viewing the second round of France’s presidential election on Sunday.

Some commentators see a confrontation of “bloc versus bloc”; of people versus elites; of anti-System versus System. They imagine that it will be a battle between an anti-Macron front and an anti-Le Pen front.

They are wrong, luckily.

If you combine the votes for all “anti-system” candidates of both Right and Left in the first round you reach 58.7 percent of the total. How could Emmanuel Macron be re-elected this weekend if the “anti-system” voters were a coherent, political force? He would not have a chance.

As it stands, the opinion polls give Macron a lead of between 9 and 12 points. How can that be?

The answer is that “bloc versus bloc”, “people versus elites” is an incomplete and misleading description of the French electoral battlefield.

I have been arguing for months – in this column and elsewhere – that the old French Right-Left system has mutated into a  muddled pattern of three broad tribes: the scattered Left and the Greens; a pro-European, consensual Centre; and a nationalist-populist, anti-migrant and anti-European Right.

I thought that these three blocs would become clearly defined and maybe develop party structures in time for the next presidential election in 2027. I was wrong. Events have moved much more rapidly.

If you assemble the first-round votes along my new fault lines, France divided on April 10th into three, almost equal parts. The six candidates of the Left got 32.2 percent; Macron’s Centre and the Valérie Pécresse rump of the centre-right got 32.4 percent; the three candidates of the nationalist Right got 32.5 percent.

The remaining 3 percent went to the eccentric and egocentric Jean Lasalle, a man who defies all categorisation.

The geology of this new electoral landscape is unstable. The boundaries can be drawn in different ways. (Should all the remaining Pécresse be counted as part of the Centre?) Each camp or tribe is internally divided. Each tribe contains parts of the “elite” and parts of “the people”. 

Nonetheless, I believe that this “Tripartite” pattern is a more accurate and useful description of the politics of France in 2022 than People v Elites schema beloved of some French philosophers, politics professors and commentators.

The division into three broad tribes explain why Macron will win on Sunday. However much they may detest Macron, far more members of the Left/Green tribe will support the Centre than will vote for the Far Right. A big chunk will, of course, abstain or stay at home.

The People v The Elite obsession is not entirely an illusion. Marine Le Pen’s electorate is heavily weighted towards the poor and the struggling, the less educated and the unhappy. One in three low-income voters – 33.8 percent – cast a ballot for her on April 10th.  

The rest of the so-called “popular bloc” is more disparate: it is neither all “popular” nor really a bloc.

Le Pen’s far right rival Eric Zemmour appeals little to the suffering working class or the alienated rural voter. His electorate is dominated by a well-heeled and well-educated part of the “elite” which detests the pro-European and racially tolerant consensus.

Mélenchon’s electorate, both his core vote and his enlarged 22 percent broader Left vote on April 10th, is even more difficult to categorise. It contains many young people from “elite” backgrounds who have passionate left-wing, ecological and anti-racist opinions. It includes only one in four working class voters but two-thirds of all Muslim voters. It includes relatively few voters in rural areas or the outer, hard-scrabble suburbs.

Equally, the 41.3 percent “elite”  or Macron-dominated bloc includes 20 percent of working class voters.  His vote was less Metropolitan than it was in 2017. He did surprisingly well in parts of rural France.

In my own village in Normandy, where Le Pen topped the first-round poll in 2017, Macron came first on April 10th with just over 30 percent. That was a great surprise to me and that of most other local people I have spoken to.

There used to be a hidden Le Pen vote in rural France. Now it appears that there is a hidden Macron vote.

The three-way electoral split should, in theory, make for difficult parliamentary election for a newly re-elected President Macron in June. I doubt it. His one third of the popular vote, if it remains united, will benefit from the oddities of the parliamentary election system in which three or four candidates can fight the second round. Then the first-past-the-post wins.

Following the calamitous performance of Les Républicains and Pécresse, the Macron-dominated Centre is well-placed to swallow up much of what remains of the moderate, pro-European centre-right. If they can resolve their own quarrels, then Macron’s allies could get a working majority in the new parliament

The Left tribe, or collection of tribes, is now dominated by the hard-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They may scatter  once again before the parliamentary elections on June 12th and 19th. If the Left does manage some kind of electoral alliance, it could win a biggish chunk of seats in the new National Assembly.

The Far Right seems irreconcilably divided between its Le Pen and Zemmour wings. If they run separately in the assembly elections – as seems inevitable – they will underperform badly.

Conclusion…

 Macron will be re-elected on Sunday. He will also get a parliamentary majority.

Wednesday evening’s televised debate may shift his winning margin, upwards or downwards a little. It won’t change the result.

Le Pen will do better in the debate this time. She could hardly do worse than she did in 2017. The fundamentals of her programme – on economy, on Europe, on climate change, on race and migration – are just as incoherent and dishonest as they were five years ago. 

If Macron teases out the contradictions (without being too aggressive) he should go on to win on Sunday by an eight to ten point margin.

And then his troubles will begin. The new political landscape means that two-thirds of all voters still regard him as an upstart and an interloper.

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JOHN LICHFIELD

OPINION: A European disaster for Macron could lead to messy autumn elections in France

The approaching European elections are predicted to be a disaster for the Macronists - but will this actually have any effect on France? John Lichfield predicts that it will, possibly even bringing fresh - and very messy - domestic elections in the autumn.

OPINION: A European disaster for Macron could lead to messy autumn elections in France

There is a paradox at the heart of Macronism. The President was elected in 2017 as a young, white-collar revolutionary who would detonate France’s repressed energy by scrapping the stifling, consensus politics of centre-left and centre-right.

And yet the profile of his voters has become progressively older. His most loyal supporters are the status-quo loving over-60s – or rather they have been until now.

One of the most striking aspects of the disastrous opinion poll results for the President’s centrist alliance before the June 9th European elections is the desertion of part of Macron’s grey army.

At the 2022 Presidential election, 39 percent of over-65s voted for Macron in the first round, compared to 28 percent in the wider electorate.

Without the oldies, Macron might have come second to Marine Le Pen in the first round two years ago. The second-round run-off, which was won 58.5-41.5 percent by Macron, would have been a very close-run thing.

In the polling before the European elections, the lead candidate for Macron’s Renew alliance, Valérie Heyer, is running neck and neck in the “grey” vote with Jordan Bardella, the lead candidate of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National.

They are on 25 percent each among the over-65s in an Ipsos poll for La Tribune.

READ ALSO Can foreign residents in France vote in European elections?

Older voters are prized by political parties because they are reliable voters. No longer, it seems. Something like half the over-65s who voted for Macron in 2022 say they won’t bother to leave home on Sunday June 9th.

The shifts in the old vote largely explains why Le Pen’s camp is leading Macron’s camp overall by 14 to 15 points – roughly 32 percent to 17 percent – a score which will have seismic consequences for French politics if confirmed in 45 days’ time.

Why are the oldies so angry with the government? Here lies another paradox.

Macron, the youngest ever President of the Fifth Republic, with the youngest ever Prime Minister, has been kind to oldies (including myself). Rather than a “President of the Getting-on-well”, he has been a “President of the Getting-on-a-Bit”.

His unpopular (but necessary) pension reform was intended, in part, to protect the comfortable pensions of those already retired.

The two Covid lockdowns (probably necessary) protected the old at the expense of the liberty of the young.

The President recently shot down the idea of a one-year freeze on pensions which would have filled the €15 billion hole in the French state budget this year.

Why then so many grumpy old men and women?

One minister blames the constant drum-beat of alarm and despondency in the 24-hour TV news channels. “Retired people are sitting in front of their televisions all day and watching images of a country they no longer recognise,” he says.

Maybe. It is natural that older people are anxious about security and inflation. They also disapprove of the fact that Macron has let the country’s finances spin out of control (but forget that they benefited from the government’s open cheque book during the Covid crisis and the energy inflation caused by the Ukraine war.)

Another striking feature of the opinion polls has been the resurrection of the centre-left, which appeared to be extinct after the Socialist candidate, Anne Hidalgo, scored only 1.75 percent in the first round of the presidential election two years ago. The Socialist champion in the European elections, Raphael Glucksmann, is running at around 12 percent and vaguely threatening to push Macron’s camp into third place.

Is this the beginning of the end of the pro-European New Centre created by Macron in 2017? Is France, which invented the terms Left and Right, lurching back towards binary Left-Right politics?

I doubt it. Glucksmann will not be a candidate in 2027; no convincing moderate politician is yet emerging to challenge the death grip on the Left of the radical, anti-European Jean-Luc Mélenchon. This is a space worth watching, all the same.

In the remaining six weeks of the European campaign, Macron’s strategy will be two-fold. He will finally get involved. He will try to remind voters that European elections are about Europe.

Starting with a big speech on the future of the EU at the Sorbonne university on Thursday, he will seek to persuade the French electorate that Le Pen is a leap into muddle and darkness and that a stronger EU is their best protection in a scary world.

Above all, Macron will try in the weeks ahead to persuade the pro-European over-65s to continue the habit of a lifetime and turn out on June 9th. He may have limited success. Le Pen’s party performs better in polls than in elections. The most recent polls shows a slight narrowing of Bardella’s lead.

But 14 points is a big gap to close in six weeks. Whatever Macron may say in his speech, most French voters, young or old, do not see this as a European election. They see it as a free-hit: a chance to bash Macron after seven years without running the risk of electing a Far Right government.

They may be wrong about that.

A Macron “defeat” by ten points or more on June 9th will increase the chances of a successful censure motion against the government in the National Assembly this summer. Macron will refuse to call an election just before the Paris Olympics. He will prolong the crisis until September when the Gabriel Attal government might fall.

We could be heading for a messy, parliamentary election in France this Autumn – at the same time as a potentially cataclysmic election in the United States and a very predictable election in the UK.

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