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OPINION AND ANALYSIS

OPINION: How to explain German vaccine hesitancy?

A look at which Germans are refusing to get vaccinated tells us a lot about their likely motivations, argues Jörg Luyken

OPINION: How to explain German vaccine hesitancy?
An anti-vaccine protester in Stuttgart. Photo: dpa | Christoph Schmidt

Germany’s vaccine campaign has been spluttering to a halt for quite some time now.

Between mid-June and mid-July 10 million people got their first jab. Between mid-July and mid-August that number had fallen to 2 million additional first timers. That leaves 35 percent of the population that hasn’t had a vaccine (although this includes children under the age of 12).

Attempts to motivate adults to get their jabs are becoming increasingly imaginative.

The latest stunt is a Berlin S-Bahn train that people can jump onto to get inoculated while seeing a bit of the city (presumably the main novelty lies in the fact that the carriages have been disinfected and don’t smell like a sewer for once.)

This initiative was pretty popular, suggesting there is the odd (younger) person out there who simply hasn’t gotten round to being vaccinated yet. But anyone who thinks such stunts will solve low vaccine take up is misjudging the mood among the unvaccinated: they haven’t booked an appointment out of forgetfulness, they are refusing to be vaccinated.

A look at where the refuseniks live is instructive. The states with the lowest vaccine uptake are all in the east.

In Saxony, just 51 percent of the population are now vaccinated. That’s remarkable given the fact that the eastern state has had by far the most deaths relative to its population. Even an initiative to give Saxonians a free Bratwurst with their BionTech couldn’t tempt enough people in the home of Hausmannskost.

Thuringia, which was also hit badly by the winter wave, barely does better on a 55 percent vaccination rate.

At the other end of the scale, the tiny city state of Bremen, which has one of Germany’s lowest death rates, has vaccinated 70 percent of its population.

The fact that Bremen is leading the pack challenges some established cliches. Low vaccine take up is linked to poverty? Bremen is just about the poorest place in the land. And Bremen’s large immigrant population also doesn’t fit easily with the narrative that migrants are suspicious of the vaccine.

READ ALSO: Berlin throws all-night party to drum up Covid vaccine tempo

So what explains the low take up in east Germany?

One school of thought has it that the AfD-voting Ossis have become so embittered and contrarian that they would have rejected Berlin’s pandemic policy whatever it had been: had the government just let life go on as normal, they would have taken to the streets bewailing overflowing emergency care stations.

Another school of thought has it that experience of totalitarianism has led east Germans to value their liberty to a higher degree than west Germans do. On this reading, lockdowns that intruded into the privacy of people’s homes were the type of tone-deaf pandemic response that only west Germans could have come up with.

The second argument isn’t without merit.

The GDR imposed mandatory vaccines on its population for a whole host of illnesses from polio to measles. Volksgesundheit trumped individual rights in the communist state. Or, as historian Malte Thießen told broadcaster MDR recently, “in the eyes of the state leadership, those who rejected vaccinations rejected socialism.”

The GDR had notable success with its vaccine campaigns in the early days, wiping out polio while it was still killing dozens of children in west Germany. But the omnipresent public health campaigns, that included vaccines at holiday camps (sound familiar?), schools and businesses, led to weariness among the public. Since the vaccines were often ineffective and some diseases proved too stubborn to be wiped out, that weariness grew even further.

By the late 1980s, despite the GDR’s heavy emphasis on public health, life expectancy in the east lagged behind the west by three years.

Of course, explaining vaccine hesitancy through east German history alone is too reductive. After all, it is not just east Germans that are unwilling: just 58 percent of Bavarians have had their jabs, ignoring the warnings of state premier and Mahner-in-Chief Markus Söder.

The long and short of it is that over 3 million Germans over the age of 60 have not taken up the offer of vaccination, inexplicably disregarding the dangers they will be exposed to come the winter.

SEE ALSO: Sensible or reckless? What Germans think about the government’s new Covid strategy

Meanwhile, the government is trying to push up its vaccine quota by encouraging teenagers, for whom the virus is no more dangerous than lung infections that have been around for decades, to use up some of the excess Impfstoff.

But, with the vaccinated still able to pass the virus on, jabbing teenagers isn’t going to stop unvaccinated pensioners from catching Covid and getting seriously ill. If anything, it’ll cement their suspicion that the universal vaccine campaign is politically motivated.

So what should the government do when case numbers escalate in the autumn? Does it have a duty to protect old people who chose not to protect themselves? And if it does, how should it do so?

One thing seems certain, Berlin’s preferred tool of lockdowns and intrusions into personal liberty would have the paradoxical effect of entrenching elderly Germans’ opposition to the medical inventions that could help them survive.

Jörg Luyken is the creator of The German Review. You can sign up to his bi-weekly newsletter on German current affairs here.

Member comments

  1. Here are few reasons 1) COVID -19 is not dangerous for vast majority. The panic around it is incomprehensible. I blamed media and politicians for that.2) Vaccinations has been created and approved in record time. The regular process takes 3 years. It is not unreasonable to be skeptical about it. Personally I know 2 people who suffers from blood clots after 2nd dose (those are middle age, very fit men btw.) 3) Attack on my personal freedom. The more state try to force me, the more I will resist. It is up to me how I want to protect myself. And no, I do no accept the argument I put in danger others or the health system. I am active and I eat very healthy – I am responsible for my health 4) lack of open debate in media and on political arena. There were scientists and medical professors criticizing the approach of our politicians. However, their voices were silent. Anyone with different opinion was immediately called anti-vaxx or far-right. That’s not how democratic system should work

    1. I think this statement sums up everything “The more state try to force me, the more I will resist”. You are against any kind of authority. All the rest you wrote is just you trying to rationalize it, i.e. you look for and cherry-pick evidence that supports your view.

      1. I wrote several arguments but you decided to address the only one which is indeed personal and emotional. So if somebody is cherry picking it is you. Not so easy to dismiss the others, right?

        1. 1) The majority of people are behaving quite ok imo. The panic crowd (as well as the “no new normal” crowd, for lack of a better term) are not so big, but are loud, and social media makes sure that their voices drown out everything. It’s the sad reality, wish we could do something about it.

          2) I really have trouble believing this. First of all, blood clots are caused by AZ (and to a lesser extent by J&J, which is not such a popular vaccine), and they are common after the 1st shot, not the 2nd.

          For example, in the UK they had 44 cases of blood clots (overall cases, not deaths) after the 2nd shot of AZ (out of 23.9 million shots administered). Germany did only 3.4 million 2nd shots with AZ, so I will extrapolate and say that around 10 people maybe got clotting after the second dose. I find it extremely unlikely that you would personally know two of these people.

          In any case, people could choose another vaccine, once these side effects were discovered. I personally decided to go for AZ even though I knew the risks, but people shouldn’t risk blood clots or death from a vaccine. But now you don’t have to make that choice.

          3) Again, you may be healthy, but if you get asymptomatic covid that ends up killing e.g. your grandparents, even if you don’t care for society as whole, you could still harm your close ones.

          We saw on several occasions what happens when you let the virus go unchecked (e.g. Bergamo, NY etc). We can’t cope with that, it strains the health care system too much, and the case fatality ratio goes way up once hospitals are full.

          Overall it’s a tricky subject, and your personal freedom can very easily infringe the freedom of others, if you are reckless.

          4) I agree with you on this one.

  2. 1) I see a big change in people. I witnessed so many situations where somebody was screaming at someone for not wearing a mask (outside!) or because somebody was standing too close. It was very disturbing. Now indeed it is better. However, I still do not understand why politicians decided for such drastic measures if COVID is harmless for most of us. Based on current statistics for Germany, the death ratio is 1% BUT this includes deaths with co-existing conditions. Prof. Dr. Bertram Häussler from Berlin estimated that probably 80% of reported deaths are not related really to COVID. Same in USA. only 5% of all reported deaths are truly deaths of COVID. How we can than justify all restrictions which harm our society? Ruined businesses, burned savings, depression, increase home violence and high inflation. Plus now the sanitary segregation of society and who knows what else is coming. This is a bill of closing the world and people for something which is as deadly as flue. I don’t see how it is justify. 2) Most of people I know are absolutely fine after vaccination. I do not argue that vaccines are dangerous for all of us. However, I prefer to wait and see if there will be no surprising side effects in a long term. Knowing 2 people with blood clots is not helpful to decide to get a jab. 3) Of course we should take care of each other and especially of our beloved ones. At the beginning of the pandemic I wouldn’t dare to see my relatives. Only later , when I could see that the virus ís not that dangerous as estimated. Now whomever wanted or needed to be vaccinated is! So how am I a threat to them? Please note that if you are vaccinated you can still get and pass the virus. Vaccination only prevents you from having severe symptoms. I can still understand the argument against congestion at the hospitals. But this winter cannot be worse than the previous one, if ca.65-70% will be fully vaccinated 4) Good to hear that!

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ECONOMY

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany’s debt brake and how does it affect residents?

Nothing sums up Germany's cautious relationship with money quite as well as the debt brake - but this little clause in the constitution has recently caused no end of chaos. Here's what you need to know about the so-called 'Schuldenbremse'.

Schuldenbremse: What is Germany's debt brake and how does it affect residents?

What is the debt brake and why did Germany introduce it?

Known as the Schuldenbremse in German, the debt brake is a cap on government borrowing that’s enshrined in Germany’s constitution. It states that the federal government can only take on a certain amount of new debt in each fiscal year.

This is capped at 0.35 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the amount of money the country produces each year in goods and services. Though GDP varies from year to year, this generally gives the government enough wiggle room to borrow around €9 billion annually.

When it comes to spending on a regional level – i.e. by state governments in Germany – the rules are even stricter. States aren’t allowed to borrow any money to fund their plans and must therefore create balanced budgets that finance spending exclusively through tax income and money from the central government.

But why exactly has Germany decided to tie itself to such strict rules on spending? Well, there are quite a few answers to that. 

Back in 2009, the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD), led by Angela Merkel, decided to bring the debt brake into law. At the time, the global economy was struggling to deal with the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, and Germany was racking up a huge deficit. 

The idea was to bring borrowing back under control as soon as possible and prevent leaving billions of euros in debt for future generations to pay off. It also paid homage to the main edicts of neo-liberalism, creating a streamlined state with little room for generous investments or high social welfare payments. 

Thanks to the ongoing effects of the financial crisis, the debt break only came into force seven years after it was put in the constitution. This means that since 2016, the federal governments have been tied to 0.35 percent cap on borrowing.

That said, there are a few exceptions to the Schuldenbremse: in periods of national emergency, such as natural disasters or pandemics, the government is allowed to put the debt brake to one side. That’s exactly what happened during the Covid pandemic in the years 2020 to 2022, and now it appears it will be put aside for the fourth year in a row. In other words, it has been sidelined for exactly half of the time it has been in place.

READ ALSO: Germany to seek debt rule suspension for 2023

Why has the debt brake been in the news recently?

The debt brake was put in the spotlight in early November when Germany’s Constitutional Court declared tens of billions of earmarked government spending to be ‘unconstitutional’.

The case related to €60 billion of borrowing that was originally intended for tackling the Covid crisis but had later been diverted towards a fund for fighting climate change known as the Climate and Transformation Fund.

In normal cases, moving unspent money around wouldn’t be a problem – but in this case, the specific rules around the debt brake came into play. Utilising the exceptions in the debt brake, the €60 billion was borrowed for the purpose of stabilising the economy during the pandemic – and as such it was only supposed to go towards tackling that emergency.

Wind turbines in Germany

Wind turbines in the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Christian Charisius

Beyond this amount, which already represents a huge chunk of the national budget, the court decision also invalidated the Economic Stabilisation Fund (WSF). This fund was also originally set up during the Covid crisis and later repurposed as Olaf Scholz’s ‘Doppelwumms’: a €200 billion pot that paid for the energy price breaks and other relief measures in the wake of the Ukraine war. 

READ ALSO:

Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) announced that the debt brake would be set aside for one more year to allow the government to meet its financial commitments for 2023. However, the budget for next year – and how the significant gaps in funding will be filled – still remain unclear.

The crisis has sparked a major debate among politicians about whether the debt brake is still fit for purpose. 

What do critics of the debt brake say? 

As you might expect, the tight controls on spending aren’t popular with everyone – especially those on the left on the political spectrum. 

Proponents of the debt brake say we should lower the deficit to avoid lumbering future generations with unmanageable debts, but critics of the mechanism make the opposite argument. They say that straightjacketing spending will actually put a strain on future generations as the government will be unable to invest in modern infrastructure and could therefore be hindering growth.

If borrowing is slashed too much and tax revenues don’t increase, projects like the green transformation, upgrading public transport and pushing ahead with digitalisation will inevitably be put on the backburner. The government will be forced to prioritise its urgent day to day spending in the present rather than trying to invest in the future – and it could also be forced to cut vital public services.

Deutsche Bahn train

Deutsche Bahn staff give the sign for an ICE high speed train to leave the main railway station in Stuttgart, southern Germany, on August 11, 2021. Photo by THOMAS KIENZLE / AFP

Other critics argue that the debt brake was appropriate at the time when it was introduced but that times have changed and governments require more flexibility. 

In the early to mid-2000s, Germany was riding high on a booming manufacturing and exports sector fuelled by cheap Russian gas, and had made little attempt to invest in renewable energy. Now, however, with Germany transitioning away from cheap Russian gas while trying to slash the country’s carbon emissions, Germany is faced with numerous expensive challenges at a time when the economy is especially weak – meaning borrowing more or raising more taxes feel like an inevitability. 

READ ALSO: ‘2024 a turning point’: When will Germany’s rail network run on time?

Could the debt brake be reformed in the future?

That’s certainly an idea that’s come from multiple camps – not least Economics Minister Robert Habeck of the Green Party. Speaking at the recent Green Party Conference, Habeck slammed the current rules on borrowing, stating: “With the debt brake as it is, we have voluntarily tied our hands behind our backs and are going into a boxing match.”

According to Habeck, the debt brake should be reformed according to the “green golden rule” to allow borrowing for investments rather than everyday spending. This is an idea that has also been put forward by economists.

Saskia Esken, the co-leader of the SPD, has also spoken out in favour of a reform of the debt brake to avoid putting a drag on growth in the future. 

However, the likelihood of this happening seems low at the moment, even if Greens and SPD politicians – and some members of the CDU – are in favour of it. 

That’s because it takes a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag to change any aspect of the Grundgesetz, or constitution – a much higher bar than the simple majority needed to change a law.

The FDP, who are in the coalition alongside the Greens and SPD, are also fiercely opposed to any reform of the debt brake and want to rein in government spending instead. 

Christian Lindner

German Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) speaks in the Bundestag. Photo: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler

Messing with this fiscal rule could also prove unpopular: a recent poll found that 61 percent on Germans were opposed to any reform of the debt brake, as opposed to 35 percent who were in favour of it, and 4 percent who didn’t know. 

It means that in the medium term at least, the government may have to take a scalpel to its previous spending plans, cutting spending on investment projects, public services like healthcare and transport and social welfare such as child and unemployment benefits. Or it may find a way to raise some taxes without upsetting the FDP. 

READ ALSO: How Germany’s budget crisis could affect you

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